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Pro posed la bor Reform : " Brave New 
Worl d "  or " looki ng Backwa rd " ? 
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE 
Unicersity of Michigan 
By now it is a commonplace in the labor relations community that 
there are two significant deficiencies in the administration of the Na­
tional Labor Relations Act. Neither is a matter of substantive law in the 
usual sense. The first is the inordinate delay in securing a remedy in 
contested cases, and the second is the inadequacy of the remedy in cer­
tain critical situations. I should like to examine a few key recommenda­
tions of the NLRB Task Force, and a few key provisions of the pro­
posed Labor Reform Act, in light of those two central concerns. 
In my assessment I shall also take into account two other factors I 
consider of similar importance. These include the need to maintain and 
enhance the acceptability of Labor Board decisions, and the need to 
ensure the full freedom of employee choice and genuine neutrality 
toward union and employer interests in view of today's industrial real­
ities. If I were to offer one general criticism of H.R. 8410, the Labor 
Reforn1 bill, it is that, for all its virtues, it is out of date before it is 
passed. It provides long-overdue solutions to the worst of yesterday's 
labor relations problems, which may not be typical today, and it does 
so in terms that are overly explicit and thus likely to hamper the flexi­
bility of future Board decision-making. At the same time, it fails to 
acknowledge some of the changing pattems of more progressive labor 
relations, and so fails to provide a legal framework for tomorrow's prob­
able industrial developments. 
Having said all this, I must salute the practical savvy of the bill's 
drafters and sponsors. They were trying to create the smallest possible 
target by concentrating on the problems of delay and the most urgently 
needed remedies, especially in situations involving unorganized em­
ployers, rather than on substantive regulation that would shift the bal­
ance of collective bargaining power as between unions and organized 
employers. Here they succeeded so admirably that I am at a total loss 
to explain the outpouring of inflated rhetoric from some organized ern-
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players and their trade associations in opposition to the bill. On balance, 
H.R. 8410 is a good bill, a reasonable bill, a generally fair bill. If the 
Senate and the subsequent Conference cannot improve it, the least 
Congress can do is to pass it. 
As NLRB Chainnan Fanning indicates, the most controversial issue 
considered by the Task Force regarding unfair labor practice procedure 
was pretrial discovery. It was so controversial, in fact, that it actually 
generated little controversy. There was quiet acceptance by most union 
and management representatives that accord on broad recommendations 
was impossible. The best that could be achieved was a comprehensive 
statement of the pros and cons of discovery, together with some sug­
gestions for its use in relatively limited circumstances. These included 
greater specificity in complaints, advance disclosure of the names of 
outside experts, advance exchange of documentary evidence not reveal­
ing the names of individual employees, and the identification of the 
positions of the parties at a pretrial conference on the day of the 
hearing. 
The principal arguments in favor of discovery are that it will speed 
up the process, encourage settlements, and be fairer to respondents by 
minimizing the burden of preparing a case while being in the dark 
about the General Counsel's line of attack. On the other hand, discovery 
engenders fears of reprisal against individual employees and of witness 
tampering. Many think discovery is too formal for NLRB proceedings, 
unduly burdensome and expensive, and time-consuming. I suspect the 
concerns about employee fear may be somewhat exaggerated, but I am 
troubled about the potential for abuse and delay. The quagmire pro­
duced by discovery in the federal courts should be instructive. 
I shall leave most comments on union representation elections to my 
colleague Bill Murphy. I must say, however, that I am a bit skeptical 
about some of the House bill's shorter time-limits. As passed by the 
House, the bill improved on the initial proposal by extending the time 
for holding an election in supposed "union majority" situations from 
two weeks to 25 days after a petition is filed. But an employer may still 
have only one week to campaign from the date the election is ordered. 
Every month or so I get a call from a small employer in a place like 
Paw Paw, Michigan, plaintively inquiring if I know of a labor lawyer 
who can help him out now that a union has sought or obtained an 
election. While recognizing the need for expediting the election process, 
I prefer the more flexible approach of the Task Force, which stresses 
tight time targets but with exceptions for good cause shown. 
The House bill tackles delay at the Board and reviewing court levels 
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in three ways. The first is to expand the Board from five to seven mem­
bers, thus enabling more panels to operate. I have reservations about 
this proposal. A smaller membership makes for greater ease and uni­
formity in administration. This may be especially important in view of 
H.R. 8410's new charge to the Board to exercise its rule-making power 
to define appropriate units, to set guidelines for union access to em­
ployer's premises, and so on. Providing for summary affirmances by the 
Board of administrative law judges' decisions is, however, a step in the 
right direction. So is the requirement that an aggrieved party must file 
a petition for court review within 30 days of the entry of the Board's 
order. 
More attention should be directed to delay at the ALJ stage. The 
average decision takes about three months. H.R. 8410 ignores the prob­
lem. The Task Force urged additional staff support, shorter opinions, 
and more production. I applaud these suggestions, but I think more 
could be expected from the ALJs even without extra assistance. No 
full-time arbitrator worth his salt would be satisfied with the current 
ALJ average production of 13 or 14 decisions a year. 
Under the House bill, a whole series of novel remedies is prescribed 
for unfair labor practices in organizing campaigns or first-contract nego­
tiations and for repeated violations of the law. I have one basic objec­
tion to this approach. While it may be good political tactics to confine 
stiff new sanctions to the most egregious offenders, such specificity will 
inevitably tend to curtail the NLRB's existing power to fashion innova­
tive remedies in other situations. Sometimes it is the long-organized 
employer that turns rogue. At least it should be declared that the newly 
spelled-out remedies are illustrative only, and do not impair the Board's 
authority to issue similar ( or different ) affirmative orders in appropriate 
circumstances. 
H.R. 8410 authorizes a form of the "make-whole" remedy for em­
ployer refusals to bargain which a 3-2 majority held beyond the Board's 
power in Ex-C ell-0 Corporation, 185 NLRB 107 ( 1970 ) .  Most disinter­
ested persons have recognized the inadequacy of the traditional cease­
and-desist order in such cases. It amounts to little more than a pious 
exhortation to go and sin no more. In the meantime, the employees have 
lost the benefit of collective bargaining for one or two years or longer. 
The new legislative remedy would be restricted to organizing or initial 
contract situations. It would apparently not be restricted, however, to 
situations in which an employer has only "frivolous" objections to a 
union's certification. Hence, an employer that "tests" a Board certifica­
tion in the only way now available-by refusing to bargain and thus 
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inviting an 8( a )  ( 5 )  charge-would also seem subject to a possible 
make-whole remedy. That is not as unfair as it may sound. Customarily 
a litigant who, in good faith, "stands on his 1ights" only to learn later 
from a court that he hasn't any, must pay the price for resisting the 
other party's valid claim. Someone has to lose in these cases, and it's 
better to have it the employer that guessed wrong than the employees 
whose rights have been sustained. 
The purpose of the "make-whole" remedy, of course, is to restore 
the employees to where they would have been if the employer had not 
engaged in its unlawful refusal to bargain. It is, in essence, a damage 
remedy reflecting the employees' lost opportunity to secure contractual 
benefits. Relief in antitrust cases is analogous. The make-whole remedy 
is not, as some employers charge, a contract imposed on the parties by 
the Board. On the other hand, I have sympathy for employers who 
object that it is unfair to measure the loss to employees of small em­
ployers by the standard of major collective bargaining settlements, in­
volving much larger companies. Moreover, on a technical note, I cannot 
understand the mathematics of the bill's formula for relief. As I read it, 
in the event of a protracted refusal to bargain, it sounds as if the em­
ployees could wind up owing the employer money. 
An employee who is discriminatorily discharged during an organizing 
effort is entitled, under H.R. 8410, to double back pay. The House bill 
would have provided for no mitigation on the basis of the employee's 
outside earnings, but on the floor an amendment was accepted covering 
compensation actually received. I think the floor change went in the 
wrong direction. "Double back pay" smacks of punitive damages. Com­
pensation, not penalty, has long been considered the theme of the 
NLRA, and I think that theme should ordinarily be preserved. At the 
same time, back pay without mitigation would be the simplest possible 
standard to apply, would not breach the nonpunitive principle, and 
would accomplish about the same thing as the House bill as passed. 
Employees discriminatorily discharged in organizing drives or first­
contract negotiations also get the benefit, under H.R. 8410, of Section 
10( 1 ) 's mandatory injunction provisions. The principle here is surely 
laudatory. I only hope the NLRB has the personnel to make it work. 
"Willful" violators of a final Board or court order are subject to an 
H.R. 8410 provision for blacklisting from federal contracts for a period 
of three years. Again, I am uneasy about the punitive implications of 
this remedy, and even more uneasy about the deleterious effects it may 
have on the very employees it is purportedly designed to help. I under­
stand, however, that a similar scheme for dealing with wage and hour 
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offenders has proved reasonably effective, and so perhaps my theoretical 
misgivings are unfounded. 
Somewhat paradoxically, I regret that neither the NLRB nor the 
Congress has seen fit to pay much heed to the use of contempt as a 
remedial device. Contempt, of course, has even more punitive overtones 
than blacklisting and double back pay. But at least it can be nicely 
tailored to flagrant individual situations, and does not rely on broadly 
inclusive categorizations. A few months in jail once had a sobering 
effect on some high-level antitrust offenders in the electrical industry. 
A similar experience might prove therapeutic for some of the executives 
of recalcitrant textile manufacturers. 
In addition to reducing delay and improving remedies, I have sug­
gested that labor law reform should encompass enhancing the accept­
ability of NLRB decisions. The House bill's increase in the term of 
Board members from five to seven years is a modest but positive con­
tribution to that end. I should have preferred terms of at least nine 
years. After more than 40 years of swinging pendulums, I feel it's about 
time for a little more stability and continuity in our labor relations law. 
Longer tenure would promote that. It would also downplay the political 
element or the appearance of the political element in Board decision­
making. Ugly rumors have occasionally emanated from the Labor Board 
about switched votes in key cases following presidential elections. Even 
if those are untrue, the appearance of such political considerations tends 
to discredit the Board and to reduce the acceptability and finality of 
· its decisions. Board members are in a precarious stance. They make few 
friends where they are, they rarely if ever advance their careers upon 
leaving the Board, and, with the exception of the redoubtable John 
Fanning, they seldom get reappointed. The least we can do is keep them 
in their august roles long enough to make it all worthwhile. I think we 
would also make their decisions substantially more acceptable, in the 
bargain. 
Lastly, I have stressed the need for full freedom of employee choice 
and the evenhanded regulation of employer and union conduct. To 
achieve those goals in today's industrial setting, options must be avail­
able for movement in several quite different directions. Some of those 
options are recognized by H.R. 8410, but some are not. The provision 
for permitting union access to employer premises to respond to captive­
audience speeches is an example of a sound response to an industrial 
reality. In the case of a large employer, especially one located in a 
metropolitan area, the plant is the natural forum for employee discussion. 
A union is seriously handicapped if confined to handbills, home visits, 
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and the like. On the other hand, the one-week period following the di­
rection of an election in "majority union" cases may be unrealistically 
short for some employers. Even if the union has a card majority, the 
employer still understandably feels entitled to a chance to talk his em­
ployees out of it. He needs time to find a lawyer, arrange an appoint­
ment, put together his arguments, and make his pitch. All this may 
sound like a dream world to some hardened combat veterans, but that's 
the way my employer out in Paw Paw sees it. 
More broadly, H.R. 8410 is deficient because it is so intent on seek­
ing to right ancient wrongs that it overlooks future possibilities. Let me 
cite just one example. There are today in this country both large and 
small companies whose employees, by their own free choice, are un­
organized. Whether they have been beguiled by wily, duplicitous em­
ployers is not for me to say. At least insofar as any of us can be said 
to exercise free choice, they have exercised it. Moreover, many of these 
employees are in highly technical fields, and their numbers are bound 
to grow. Now, even though they are not unionized, their employers do 
not wish to ignore them. Indeed, companies often wish to solicit their 
views in a systematic way. Inevitably, the employer or some worker 
will come up with the idea of a "representative committee." The com­
pany is even happy to provide an office and a typewriter. We have this 
sort of thing all over the country. And of course nearly every one of 
these arrangements is, under the wooden logic of the applicable NLRB 
decisions, a violation of Section 8 ( a )  ( 2) of the Labor Act. As some 
federal courts of appeals have realized, however, Section 8 ( a )  ( 2 )  was 
aimed at quite different targets, at the shabby "company unions" of the 
1930s and at the employer who gave aid and comfort to his favorite as 
between two or more competing unions. If, in the contemporary situation 
I have described, the employees chose freely and knowingly and the 
committee or other body acts truly on their behalf and for their benefit, 
no reason exists for objection save ideology. Should the weight of prece­
dent be too heavy to permit validating such arrangements, the law 
should be changed. 
In a scant seven years, provided we all survive 1984, we shall be 
celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Wagner Act. The abuses we 
are discussing now were supposedly treated then, and the remedies cur­
rently proposed are thus long, long past due. Indeed, in some respects 
it is a sorry spectacle to see us all here today earnestly analyzing a set 
of procedures and remedies, nearly all of which, under just a mildly 
generous reading of the Wagner Act, the NLRB could long since have 
adopted on its own. But if H.R. 8410 is necessary to rout out the last of 
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the intractables in certain benighted industries, it should certainly be 
passed, with or without modifications of the type I have proposed. And 
then we must start thinking about the kind of law that will be needed 
to regulate the more enlightened labor relations of the next half century. 
